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I 
WHY IS TIIlS MAN A MODERATE? 
Richard A. Epstein* 
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS. By 
William A. Fischel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1995. 
Pp. xi, 415. $45. 
Moderation, Aristotle assures us, is a cardinal virtue that allows 
individuals to organize their lives for happiness and self-
sufficiency.1 Thus when "proper pride" is the mean, "empty vanity" 
and "undue humility" are Aristotle's two extremes to be avoided; 
and when liberality is the mean, prodigality and meanness become 
his extremes.2 In a more modem vein we prefer enterprise to both 
greed or indifference. So sensible. Yet it is far from clear that 
Aristotle's steady middle-course plan for personal character devel-
opment supplies an accurate guide to the soundness of academic or 
legal positions, especially on matters so controversial as the proper 
role for government in the regulation of private property. Here the 
ostensible security of the middle position may be an illusion. Some 
comer solution may, but need not, be preferable to a compromise 
position that has all the sounds of sweet reasonableness about it, 
but nonetheless fails to achieve a set of optimal social results. 
It is just that "vice of moderation" that leads me to part com-
pany with many of the key substantive conclusions in William 
Fischel's3 excellent recent book Regulatory Takings. Fischel jour-
neys far and wide over one of the pivotal questions of our time: 
What are the permissible limitations on government regulation of 
private property? I shall devote this review to that question. But in 
approaching Fischel's work, I shall proceed by indirection, so as not 
to confront a highly theoretical question solely as an abstract mat-
ter. Fischel's great forte is his ability to combine the insights of a 
trained economist with the nose of a superb investigative reporter. 
To highlight my disagreement with his conclusions, I want to pay 
my respects to Fischel by using his illustrations to make my points, 
while adding to the mix a few pointed anecdotes of my own. Ac-
cordingly, I have divided this review into two parts. Part I deals 
* ·James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago. 
A.B. 1964, Columbia; B.A. 1966, Oxford; LL.B. 1968, Yale. - Ed. My thanks to Cass Sun-
stein for his valuable comments on my earlier draft of this review. 
1. See ARISTOTLE, THE NrcOMACHEAN ETHICS 33-36 (D.P. Chase trans., 1937). 
2. See id. at 37-40. 
3. Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College. 
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with Fischel's various historical and sociological researches, both to 
give the reader some flavor for his book and also to set the stage for 
my evaluation of his overview of constitutional law. Part II ad-
dresses the perennial question of how far the courts should inter-
vene to protect property owners from government regulation. To 
get into that question Fischel uses Frank Michelman's 1967 "undy-
ing classic" just-compensation article4 and my own book, Takings, 5 
as his foils. The examples outlined in Part I become the basis for an 
examination of our three positions. I conclude, unsurprisingly per-
haps, that the new evidence only fortifies the soundness of my origi-
nal, if extreme, position - unrepentant to the end! 
l. ANECDOTES WITH A PURPOSE 
All too often today, economists become mired in abstract theory 
or trapped by detailed econometric demonstrations. Fischel's read-
able book avoids both of these unfortunate extremes and concen-
trates with intelligence and balance on the institutional 
arrangements at stake in particular cases, with an eye to explaining 
long-standing practices by sensible, mid-level economic theory. 
Even readers who might reject all of his speculations will be re-
minded of how institutional texture can help s~ape our understand-
ing of complex legal and social arrangements just by reading how 
he works the phones and walks the landscape. 
In the first chapter, Fischel gathers the true scoop of 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,6 the granddaddy of modern tak-
ings cases. That case concerned the constitutionality of the Kohler 
Act,7 which required mineowners to provide subjacent support for 
surface owners even when their deeds unambiguously required sur-
face owners to bear the risk of subsidence. Doctrinally, Penn-
sylvania Coal arose because the legislation retransferred the surface 
owners' surrendered "support estates" from the mineowners to the 
surface owners, without compensation. Justice Holmes struck down 
the statutory transfer on the ground that the regulation went "too 
far" to be a valid exercise of the police power.8 Holmes thus an-
nounced a takings standard that, from that time forward, has con-
founded friend and foe alike. 
Although many academics have attempted to decipher the pre-
cise meaning of Holmes's delphic language, Fischel here follows a 
4. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 {1967). 
5. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN (1985). 
6. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
7. See 260 U.S. at 412. 
8. See 260 U.S. at 414-15. 
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different tack. He has pieced together the entire story behind 
Pennsylvania Coal by indefatigable investigation: tirelessly making 
phone calls to the surviving relatives of the original principals; read-
ing the texts of George E. Stevenson, a consulting mechanical engi-
neer knowledgeable in the construction and operation of mines in 
the Scranton area between 1897 and 1930;9 sifting through Scranton 
newspapers published in the 1920s; unearthing the anthracite coal 
production techniques in Pennsylvania in use from the late 1890s to 
1950; and uncovering the political machinations that led to the pas-
sage of the Kohler Act. 
It proves, moreover, a story with a punchline. Fischel makes the 
useful observation that technology did not exacerbate the problem 
of subsidence -in other words, residences falling into the mines 
below - but tended to moderate it. Starting around 1891 (p. 27), 
coal engineers found a way to take the slag and waste from previous 
production and to insert it into mines to support the surface and the 
structures on it. This technical innovation made it possible to ex-
tract more coal from the mines without precipitating a conflict with 
surface owners. More importantly, it probably did more good for 
overall industrial development and community relationships than 
any legal rule designed to allocate the far greater losses under the 
older, inferior technology. The lesson, which has doubtless been 
played out countless times since then, should remind us of an im-
portant truth too easily forgotten in this age when economists and 
lawyers struggle to design contract rules for optimal risk and loss 
allocation: it is better to prevent the loss practically than to manip-
ulate liability rules to create incentives for optimal care. Improved 
technology helps reduce the risk levels and the destruction of natu-
ral resources by allowing the recycling and reuse of materials previ-
ously thought exhausted. 
Fischel's account of Pennsylvania Coal does more than show the 
beneficial interaction between law and technology; it also captures 
the legal and social dynamics of the time. The problem of subsi-
dence had been addressed by the voluntary arrat}gements of most 
- the qualification will be important - coal companies and sur-
face owners before the passage of the Kohler Act. Viewed in isola-
tion from its social context, the conflict between the surface owner 
and the mineowner could look like a two-party bilateral monopoly 
extraction game, but clearly much more was at work. The relevant 
coal deposits were quite literally spread out all over Scranton; the 
men who worked the mines lived in the houses atop the mines and 
had, therefore, an interest on both sides of these transactions. 
Their employers, the mineowners, knew and up.derstood the local 
9. Seep. 26 (citing GEORGE E. STEVENSON, REFLECTIONS OF AN ANTHRACITE ENGINEER 
{1931)). 
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social dynamic. So although they secured contractual protection 
against liability for the repair of the surface from mining subsi-
dence, they routinely fixed the surface premises, no questions 
asked, once subsidence took place. It was simply a matter of good 
public relations, as a former chief engineer of Pennsylvania Coal 
Company - and one of Fischel's well-placed sources - told 
Fischel in 1993 (pp. 38, 43). Sal Nardozzi, a mining engineer for the 
state of Pennsylvania during the 1960s, duly confirmed this version 
of history (p. 43). The breakdown in the relationships took place 
because a single insolvent company, People's Coal, reneged on all 
its agreements. So tJ;ie Kohler Act emerged to plug the gap in the 
earlier social arrangements. 
As Fischel points out, the adopted system proved more compli-
cated than one might expect. This was because the Kohler Act was 
paired with another statute, The Fowler Act,10 which imposed a tax 
on the anthracite coal extracted by companies that sought relief 
from the obligations of the Kohler Act (p. 33) and whose proceeds 
were to be devoted to the repair of subsidence. Any firm that com-
plied with the Kohler Act did not have to pay the Fowler tax. Once 
the Supreme Court struck down the Kohler Act in Pennsylvania 
Coal, no one needed any relief from it. The situation returned to 
the status quo ante. Armed with their victory, the coal companies 
continued to make routine repairs of subsidence damage just as 
they did before the Kohler Act was passed. The social glue that 
kept miners and surface owners together was just too strong. The 
parallels to the informal norms that governed cattle trespass in 
Shasta County, as outlined in Robert Ellickson's book Order 
Without Law11 are evident, and Fischel does not overlook them 
(pp. 45-47). 
Fischel might have pressed one question further: If the mine-
owners were resolved to repair surface damage anyhow, then why 
did they fight the statute? The instinctive answer is; there is no 
reason at all, since opposition to the statute costs money, but suc-
cessful legal action will not save any expenditure on repairs. But 
the pattern of legal opposition and social compliance is a common 
one, and there are good reasons for it. To explain, let me resort to 
an anecdote of my own that has strongly influenced my view about 
legal obligations. When my wife and I moved to Chicago in 1972 
we rented a two-bedroom apartment in a new high-rise that was 
then only partly rented. As a young law professor I did something 
that I might not do today: I read the lease. In doing so, I discov-
ered that the landlord assumed no obligations for repairs of damage 
10. See 260 U.S. at 400. 
11. ROBERT c. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SE.TI'LE DISPUTES 
(1991). 
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that took place inside the units. But I also noted that the building 
had a full-time maintenance staff at the beck and call of the tenants. 
I asked the rental agent to explain the difference between the tough 
talk in the lease and the prompt service in the building - even then 
I knew it was better than the reverse situation of a promise of ser-
vice with no maintenance staff. 
Her answer made perfectly good sense. The building owners 
knew that reputation matters in attracting and keeping tenants in a 
building, but they drafted the lease such that they could have con-
trol, without judicial intervention, of any bad-apple tenant whom 
they distrusted. Should they have to demonstrate to an 
independent third party that they were in compliance with some 
"for cause" norm for withholding repair services, they could easily 
fail. The private knowledge that they had about the behavior of 
tenants, the conditions of the units, and the source of the damage 
easily could be lost in translation, and they would lose control over 
their own operations. Furthermore, if good tenants left because 
bad tenants stayed, then the whole building could fall into disarray. 
Knowing that the landlord had the tools to protect us from neigh-
boring tenants who might otherwise make life unpleasant, my wife 
and I eagerly signed the lease, and the two years we lived there 
repaid our confidence. The legal risk that the landlord might deny 
its obligation to repair never came to pass, and the building pros-
pered until it was converted into condominiums over twenty years 
later. 
That same lesson applied in the mines. The creation of a legal 
duty enforced by public inspectors could alter the balance of power 
between the coal company and the surface owner in ways that could 
reduce the overall effectiveness of the informal system of repairs. 
An obligation to repair does not indicate when, where, and how 
repairs have to be made. Put the law on the surface owners' side 
and the repairs that are demanded could become too perfect rela-
tive to their costs. Parties struggle to keep legal control when they 
obey social norms cutting in the opposite direction. Their legal 
dominance limits the extent of their risk and controls the costs of 
their operations. The conversion of a social norm to a legal norm 
does not therefore necessarily represent a movement to rectify 
some imperfection; sometimes, it eliminates a small imperfection 
and replaces it with a larger one. The law does not automatically 
fulfill social expectations by converting them to legal obligations: it 
may transform them for the worse. Although Fischel does not draw 
the conclusion as forcibly as he should, he offers still more evidence 
that the local knowledge of private repeat players often yields bet-
ter practical solutions than the heavy-handed legal regimes that dis-
place them. 
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The discussion of Pennsylvania Coal, occupying the first forty-
seven pages of the book, represents Fischel's most sustained investi-
gation for this book. But Regulatory Takings contains many other 
smaller illustrations of his overall ingenuity in tracing out the impli-
cations of general legal decision. Here I shall mention just a few of 
those, most of which I hope to show have a real point. 
A. Cedar and Apple Trees 
Miller v. Schoene,12 one of the major classics of takings law de-
cided shortly after Pennsylvania Coal, raised the classical Coasean 
question of inconsistent uses by neighbors. In the Piedmont section 
of Virginia, both red cedar trees and apple trees can thrive. But the 
red cedars also play host to a "rust" fungus that in a later stage of 
its life is capable of destroying the apple trees. The state law al-
lowed ten neighbors to petition the state entomologist to examine 
local red cedars for rust infection and to destroy the infected 
trees.13 The owners of the red cedars received no compensation for 
their pains. 
Fischel, setting out this history with his usual clarity, notes that 
the value of the apple trees usually exceeded that of the cedars 
(p. 152). While the apples grew a commercial crop, the cedars were 
usually a scrub tree of no particular value, and hardly worth more 
as trees than as cut timbers. According to Fischel, the basic legisla-
tion therefore possessed credibility because it looked like a typical 
antinuisance statute, not dissimilar to a law that required individual 
owners "to mow their lots to suppress ragweed" (p. 153). Since the 
value of the apple trees exceeded that of the cedar trees, and since 
that was generally known, why not dispense with the requirement 
of compensation given the overall efficiency gains of the statute? 
The costs of settlement were greater than any demoralization costs 
that might have been felt by the owners of the cedar trees and their 
sympathizers - the critical point in Fischel's examination of 
Michelman's views on the compensation question. 
B. Beachfront Management 
One of the key issues in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council14 was whether land owned by David Lucas became worth-
less once he was prohibited from building on it. Not content to rest 
on the trial judge's findings to that effect, Fischel walked the prem-
ises and checked the legal record and found that the only possible 
uses of the pr,emises - camping and tenting - were also prohib-
12. 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
13. See 276 U.S. at 277-78. 
14. 503 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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ited by restrictive covenant. The claim of worthlessness was in fact 
correct (p. 60). 
He recounts the history of Lucas following remand to the South 
Carolina courts. Because the wipeout was complete and the nui-
sance exception for regulation was not available, the court forced 
the state to purchase the land (p. 61). What it did next contains the 
lesson about the incentives created when state actions carry an obli-
gation to compensate. Faced with the need to raise money for the 
land, the state decided to sell it off. One neighbor was prepared to 
pay $315,000 for one of the parcels to protect his view - itself a 
revelation as to the values of views to neighbors - but the state 
turned that down to sell it to someone else who was prepared to 
pay $392,500 to use the lot for development (p. 61). When the cash 
was to come out of its till, the state was not prepared to keep the 
land vacant for $77,500. Why then should it have been allowed to 
wipe out David Lucas altogether? 
C. Large Lot Zoning 
As exhibit four, consider Agins v. City of Tiburon, 1s a case in 
which the Court allowed the City of Tiburon to impose a five-acre 
minimum lot-size restriction on a choice piece of waterfront prop-
erty. The restriction sprang up after an outsider purchased the land 
with the intention of dividing it into lots conformable to others in 
the neighborhood, on the order of four houses per acre. Fischel's 
conversation with the feisty Gideon Kanner - long active in the 
property rights movement - revealed that Agins would have aban-
doned his challenge of the zoning ordinance had it permitted him to 
build a single house per acre (p. 53). But the local officials evi-
dently understood that they had the whip hand, for their position 
was eventually sustained in the California and United States 
Supreme Courts. 
D. Lateral Easements and Unconstitutional Conditions 
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 16 the Court held 
that the State of California could not condition a building permit on 
the willingness of the landowner to surrender to the Coastal Com-
mission a lateral easement, parallel to the beach, across the front of 
his property. The easement did not have an essential nexus to any 
legitimate purpose of the state, such as preserving views of the 
beach for the public at large. Again, Fischel journeyed to the site. 
In so doing, he discovered that the Nollans' house did not block 
views of the Pacific Ocean from the Pacific Coast Highway, but that 
15. 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), affd., 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
16. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
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the view from a nearby street was blocked by a six-foot fence on 
private property whose use was not challenged in the case. The 
Commission apparently did not care as much about views as Justice 
Scalia's hypothetical suggested.17 
Nollan is important for another reason as well. The question in 
Nollan was a variation of the problem of unconstitutional condi-
tions. Nollan conceded - wrongly, in my view - that the state 
could have rebuffed the Nollans' request to rip down an old shack 
and replace it with a modem home similar to those built by their 
neighbors. Nollan also conceded that the state could allow that 
construction without conditions attached. Justice Scalia dug in his 
heels and said that the condition requiring the lateral easement was 
void and that the building permit had to be granted.18 Justice 
Scalia's justification was not entirely clear, but one might argue that 
he wished to police the boundary under current law between com-
pensable takings of possessory interests and the largely noncom-
pensable takings of rights of use or disposition. Thus, he had to 
prevent the state from initiating swaps of one type of interest for 
the other, lest the structural distinction created by standard takings 
doctrine fall into disarray. 
The critics of that position said that what helped Nollan well 
could hurt other landowners, for in the next case the Coastal Com-
mission just might refuse to deal. For example, I speculated that 
the Commission might decide to allow the structure to be built if 
the only alternative was to leave the lot in its current shape.19 My 
instinct was that the Commission would value the increased tax rev-
enues that could be collected from its construction.20 However, 
Fischel's conversations with Gideon Kanner and Robert Best, both 
active in the field, indicated that my uncharacteristic optimism lacks 
foundation (p. 346). The Commission is as tough as it always has 
been and perhaps tougher, for now it knows that compromise could 
yield the Nollan outcome. On this score at least, Fischel's predic-
tion outperformed my own. 
The question then arises, why is Fischel right? Here Fischel's 
own view of the differential responsiveness of government at differ-
ent levels helps to explain the phenomenon (pp. 276-77). The in-
creased revenues from the property tax go to the local 
governments, not to the Commission. The gain is external to the 
Commission. When a local option to administer the statute exists, 
as it does in Michigan, matters could be different.21 These local 
17. See 483 U.S. at 836. 
18. See 483 U.S. at 837. 
19. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 183 (1993). 
20. See id. 
21. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.902 (Supp. 1995). 
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officials can obtain the revenues from increased development and 
therefore should be more willing to grant approvals when given 
genuine discretion (which, in my experience, is the case). The point 
illustrates another danger from Coastal Commissions. Only a single 
set of concerns lies within the scope of their jurisdiction, so they 
ignore important social benefits that fall outside their ken. In this 
case at least, a form of local administration of a statewide regula-
tion will do better than its statewide administration, even if the 
legal norms do not vary. 
E. Rent Control 
Let me give one more example. Fischel notes that rent-control 
statutes often work to the benefit of sitting tenants who can use 
their muscle in local elections to advance their own political inter-
ests. At the same time, he points out a subtle connection between 
the rise of rent control in California and the passage of Proposition 
13, which freezes property taxes at existing levels until a property is 
sold in the marketplace, at which time it becomes revalued at its 
true market level. The passage of Proposition 13 meant that local 
governments were less concerned with the property values within 
their boundaries because they could not increase the amount of the 
tax (pp. 303, 307). The upshot was that there was less resistance to 
measures that would reduce aggregate property values because the 
consequences would largely fall elsewhere. Hence, the local oppo-
sition to rent control should weaken after Proposition 13, allowing 
for the observed spread of rent control. 
The use of rent control has additional consequences. For exam-
ple, Fischel discusses the politics behind the local ordinances upheld 
in Yee v. City of Escondido. 22 These ordinances set the rents that 
owners of mobile-home pads could charge to renters.23 The 
reduced value of the pads led to an increased value of the comple-
mentary resource, the mobile home. Therefore, as long as the 
mobile-home owner remained in possession, he could capture that 
gain in use. Once he departed the premises, that benefit would be 
· lost to either the landlord or to some subsequent tenant. The pres-
ent mobile-home owners, however, had more political clout than 
the owners of the mobile-home parks, and therefore could secure 
the passage of laws, upheld in Yee, that allowed the purchaser of a 
mobile home to succeed to the seller's rights under the lease. The 
system proved in one sense more efficient than a rule that did not 
allow the mobile-home owner to transfer property rights, for it en-
couraged alienation when the new mobile-home owner valued the 
22. 503 U.S. 519 (1992). 
23. See 503 U.S. at 521. 
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land more than the old one. By the same token, it made more 
explicit the expropriation of the landlord's proprietary interest. 
Judge Kozinski had held this rent-control scheme unconstitutional 
as a possessory taking,24 only to be rebuffed by the Supreme Court 
in Yee. Fischel notes sadly that in cases like this the Constitution 
should have served to protect the landlord's investment against the 
excesses of majoritarian politics (p. 324). 
F. California Housing Costs 
California also became the subject of Fischel's informative 
investigation of the relationship between judicial behavior and the 
high cost of housing in California after 1970. Fischel presents a 
table showing that the ratio of housing costs to annual income 
. through the United States hovered around 2 to 1 from about 1960 
to 1990, while in California that ratio moved from near the national 
average to 4.8 to 1 by 1990 (p. 239). He then examines a wide range 
of independent explanations - scarcity of land, increases in costs 
of production, and influx of population - and concludes that all 
fail. Huge portions of land were available for development 
throughout the state; the cost of construction did not deviate much 
from the national averages; and the influx of population fell, in part 
because of the high cost of housing, as the ratio of home cost to 
income rose (pp. 225-26, 237-39). He ultimately concludes that the 
rise resulted from the unremitting judicial hostility of the California 
Supreme Court to developers· (pp. 226-32). That hostility mani-
fested itself in two ways. In Friends of Mammoth v. Board of 
Supervisors,25 the court overread the state environmental protec-
tion statutes to require an environmental impact statement for any 
private development, thereby allowing private groups to slow down 
the process. It also denied any claims for compensation filed by · 
individual property owners against developers. In addition, in 
Agins it prohibited interim damages even when a restriction was 
struck down as a taking, allowing the aggrieved landowner only in-
junctive relief; a decision that was overruled in First English. 26 Fi-
nally, it tended to side with neighbors even when state agencies 
wanted to grant variances or permits to landowners.27 Its heavy 
thumb on the scales raised the cost of development and reduced the 
supply, creating the affordable housing crunch. · 
24. See Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270 {9th Cir. 1987). 
25. 502 P.2d 1049 (Cal. 1972). 
26. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 
{1987). 
27. See, e.g., Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 522 P.2d 
12 (Cal. 1974). Fischel does not cite the case, but it supports his opinion. 
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II. ASSESSING THE RIVAL THEORIES 
By example and discussion, Fischel gives us a strong flavor of 
the patterns of land-use regulation throughout the United States. 
Tue question thus becomes how constitutional theory ought re-
spond to his survey. Fischel attempts to overview the doctrinal 
structure of modern takings law, but this proves by and large the 
weakest aspect of his book. An economist by training, he lacks the 
patience required to wade through the byways and ambiguity of 
legal doctrine and tends instead to resort to capsule summaries of 
the law which, while hardly wrong, lack nuance and refinement. 
Even his headings consistently emit a didactic tone: " 'Public Use' 
is a Minor Limitation on Takings," "Lochner v. New York Epito-
mized Economic Due Process," or "Judicial Review Presents the 
Countermajoritarian Problem" (pp. 71, 109, 118). In short, the ex-
plication of legal doctrine is not the chief virtue of this book. 
Fischel, however, manages to do a more than commendable job 
dealing with the academic theories of eminent domain. In large 
measure, he seeks to define his own position in opposition to Frank 
Michelman's great essay on just compensation28 and my position set 
out in Takings. 29 His criticisms seem both fair and tempered, and 
they lead him to an eclectic view that steers a middle course be-
tween too much and too little judicial review. Throughout his dis-
cussion, Fischel addresses two chief worries. First, he fears that 
constitutional intervention entrusts too much power to judges and 
is therefore unacceptable in democratic societies. At the same 
time, he is enough a realist to recognize the defects of the local 
political process that he outlined so well. He, therefore, tends to 
favor some heightened form of judicial review when the assets in 
question are tied to a specific jurisdiction, and when the political 
process in those jurisdictions is skewed in a way that renders minor-
ities and outsiders incapable of defending themselves in the demo-
cratic arena (pp. 327-29). By this standard, the actions of small 
local townships - where these vices are evident - receive the 
highest level of judicial scrutiny, and the actions of the federal gov-
ernment - which represents in a Madisonian sense the collective 
wisdom of the extended republic - receive the lowest. States fall 
into an intermediate category, but in general he accords them high 
levels of deference like the national government (p. 328). Large 
cities such as New York or Los Angeles fit into another intermedi-
ate category in which they receive higher scrutiny than national or 
state governments, but not quite that of local governments (p. 329). 
28. See Michelman, supra note 4. 
29. See EPSTEIN, supra note S. 
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Fischel thus tries to achieve an efficient level of regulation 
through a mixture of political and judicial controls. More accu-
rately, he is acutely aware of institutional imperfections and seeks 
to come as close to the elusive ideal as possible. In reaching this 
position he starts with a fine explication of the Michelman position, 
the basics of which are as follows (pp. 141-59). In dealing with any 
government project, Michelman identifies four relevant variables. 
First, there· are the benefits of the project in question (B) and their 
associated economic costs (C). For these purposes we put aside the 
ambiguities in definition and valuation and note that those projects 
that merit completion when B-C > 0. 
The question then arises whether the losers of such government 
process should receive compensation. To answer that question 
Michelman introduces the next two quantities: demoralization 
costs (D) and settlement costs (S). Demoralization costs equal "the 
dollar value necessary to offset disutilities which accrue to losers 
and their sympathizers specifically from the realization that no 
compensation is offered."30 It amounts to a cost borne of sympathy 
with the position of the uncompensated loser, but ironically it does 
not extend to any sympathy with individuals who are upset that the 
property was taken with compensation. Finally, settlement cost is 
the cost of hammering out and enforcing compensation agreements. 
As Fischel rightly notes, under Michelman's famous formula the 
government should not undertake a project when B-C < min (D,S), 
that is, when no net benefit results from the project even after the 
government seeks to minimize its impact by choosing the smaller of 
Dor S (p. 146). Rather, it says that when the government does the 
project, it should pay compensation if B-C > S, and S < D (p. 146). 
It also says that the government owes no compensation if B-C > D, 
and D < S, that is, when the project is worth undertaking, but the 
compensation costs more than it achieves (p. 146). This interpreta-
tion led Fischel to support the Supreme Court's decision in Miller. 
Surprisingly, Michelman did not apply his general formula to 
the full range of takings cases; instead, he concentrated on some 
difficult cases involving fast.lands near navigable waters.31 It is in-
structive nevertheless to see how that formula plays out in the con-
text of general land use regulation of the sort that preoccupies 
Fischel, of which rent control and zoning restrictions seem common 
examples. First, the strongest case for not proceeding is when C > 
B, so that there is no net benefit. All forms of rent control that 
30. Michelman, supra note 4, at 1214. 
31. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961); United 
States v. 1\vin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956). For my views, see Richard A. Epstein, 
The Takings Jurisprudence of the Warren Court: A Constitutional Siesta, 31 TULSA L. REv. 
643, 651-56 (1996). 
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distort competitive markets beyond recognition fall into that cate-
gory, as Fischel would agree. So, too, do those forms of land use 
regulations designed to suppress economic competition by neigh-
bors or, as in Lucas, to produce huge private losses for small social 
gains. The Michelman formula is striking in that it somehow as-
sumes that the decision has been made that these projects will not 
be undertaken without supplying any mechanism to secure this de-
sired outcome. By concentrating so heavily on the relationship be-
tween D and S, it tends to assume that the issue of compensation 
arises only when B > C, and it fails to provide a filter to see that this 
condition is satisfied by the projects undertaken. 
This approach misses one key function of a just-compensation 
test: making sure that only projects that satisfy this minimum con-
dition (B > C) get off the ground. That can be done only if one 
respects the proposition that any form of government regulation that 
moves us from a competitive to a monopoly situation is per se a com-
pensable taking. This test produces the desired result; the state will 
have to raise the funds, and, as in Lucas, it will find no takers for 
the tax payment. Who will pay more in order to get less? The pro-
ject therefore will die a natural death. The weeding out of these 
bad projects is so fundamental that any analysis that concentrates 
on the correct treatment of compensation for positive sum projects 
undertaken by the state pales into insignificance beside it. Com-
pensation then could be ordered when D appears smaller than S, a 
result whose error costs, even when positive at all, are likely to be 
small. Thus, once we link the Michelman formula to the standard 
theories of welfare economics, it tolerates far more mischievous 
government intervention than Michelman himself had 
acknowledged. 
Indeed the whole enterprise starts to call for the invalidation of 
the entire panoply of New Deal statutes as unconstitutional.32 
Thus, in principle, takings are not limited to cases of physical occu-
pation, but cover all situations in which the government restricts 
use or limits the rights of disposition of the owners. The govern-
ment could justify such a limitation by showing that it prevents 
some nuisance-like behavior of the individual owner, but when it 
lacks such a justification the state must compensate the losers, even 
if it divides the surplus of its actions, B-C, among the public at 
large. Necessary cash may be raised by taxes collected from the 
individuals benefited by the project in question. In some instances 
the compensation comes in-kind, that is, the benefits generated by 
the projects are transferred to the individuals burdened by it. The 
inquiry here turns roughly empirical and yields the following result: 
when the distribution of benefits and burdens fall equally, the 
32. See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 281. 
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political process will tend to deliver good results. If I can gain only 
by bearing an equal fraction of the costs, then my judgment will be 
incentive-compatible with the welfare of the overall system. I will 
take ten if I have to pay eight, but not pay ten in order to get eight. 
Since in the simplest cases my position is identical with that "Of all 
others, then all persons get ten and pay eight when I, or some ma-
jority of which I am a member, make the decision in question. In 
constitutional theory, the disproportionate-impact test, so often 
cited as an intuitive test of fairness, captures this very point.33 The 
point also corresponds with the views advanced by Robert Ellick-
son that the state cannot enjoin normal uses, that is, those customa-
rily and widely distributed in society, by one set of individuals while 
allowing others, especially those who have arrived in a given com-
munity first in time, to engage in them.34 The local government 
that imposes five-acre restrictions on latecomers cannot survive if 
its voting owners happily reside on half-acre plots. 
One can go further and note the consequences of applying this 
comprehensive accou11-t of takings to the cases mentioned earlier in 
this review. Pennsylvania Coal comes out the same way, but not 
because of any intuition that some regulations "go too far" and 
some do not. All regulations are takings, and the length to which 
they "go" influences only the amount of compensation owing for 
their loss. In this case, the transfer by statutory command of the 
support estate from the miners to the landowners surely constitutes 
a taking, and one that should be nullified since the state paid no 
compensation. This outcome simply depends on the settled-upon 
property rights system and not on any unprincipled distinction be-
tween physical and regulatory taking, which fails to explain how the 
support estate should be classified. While it might be said that great 
dislocations could result under this approach, in point of fact they 
did not. The power of the local voluntary social conventions, whose 
effectiveness is strengthened if protected against mischievous gov-
ernment attack, prevents their occurrence. Wherein lies the peril of 
that decision, or indeed of any that rejects any effort to reassign to 
A, by force of law, rights that he has conveyed to B? 
Next we return to Miller. Here Fischel offers two inconsistent 
explanations. First, the Michelman argument: B-C > 0, and S > D, 
thus, compensation is not required (p. 146). However, that result 
countenances the taking of the fee simple in land when the project 
is sound; it also assumes that the supporters of the present owners 
will not be upset because of the noble cause for which the land was 
33. See Annstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
34. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and 
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 681 (1973). 
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taken. Yet surely the Michelman formula does not apply to physi-
cal takings; why then give it special weight for regulatory takings? 
Alternatively, Fischel suggests that the cedar trees could be re .. 
garded as a nuisance, like the ragweed (p. 153). But here too I find 
a difference worth some notice. The ragweed spreads by ordinary 
wind, and thus the causation is surely proximate. The cedar tree, on 
the other hand, emits no substance. It is at best a habitat for a pest. 
It is a close question whether this situation involves a nuisance. All 
the same, the classification of the hard borderline case presents less 
cause for concern than does the proposition, made in Miller, that 
the nuisance issue does not matter anyhow and that it is sufficient if 
the state compares the value of the red cedars with the apple trees. 
Yet just that line was taken by Justice Stone when he wrote that 
"we need not weigh with nicety the question whether the infected 
cedars constitute a nuisance according to the common law; or 
whether they may be so declared by statute."35 But if one need not 
do so, then what decides the compensation question? If it is 
whether the value of apple trees exceeds the value of the cedars, 
then we arrive at the same problem as before: in ordinary takings 
cases no one could condemn ohe parcel of land for nothing just 
because it was worth less than another, so why here? In addition, if 
the law of nuisance determines whether a private owner may obtain 
a judicial order for the destruction of the cedar trees, why en-
courage the enormous discontinuity between public and private law 
that Justice Stone's reading of Miller invites? Fischel therefore 
stands on his strongest ground when he declares the nuisance anal-
ogy sufficient to carry the day. Once he takes that position, he fol-
lows my analysis of the case to the letter.36 
With regard to Lucas, the difficult question is why the case was 
brought at all. The total denial of the use of right was surely com-
pensable, given the absence of any nuisance. The mystery of Lucas 
lies in the unexplained reluctance of Justice Scalia to apply the an-
tinuisance paradigm to use restrictions that did not amount to total 
takings. Once the Court confirms its compensation rule: "Take all, 
pay full value; take 99 percent, and pay nothing at all," one may 
easily predict what strategy states will adopt. Always allow some 
minimal use; always give further procedural options; and then "if all 
else fails, merely amend the regulation and start all over again" 
(p. 365). Fischel offers this piece of timeless, if cynical, advice to 
local governments whose regulations have been struck down (p. 
365). Lest anyone think that the waiting game will not work, the 
Bleak House saga in Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank37 - a 
35. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 {1928). 
36. See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 112-21. 
37. 473 U.S. 172 {1985). 
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case that Fischel could have discussed with profit but did not -
illustrates how, in a world of shifting substantive standards, delay 
tactics can be an art form, all with the blessing of the Court. So why 
the judicial deference to government actions? 
Agins tells the same story. The normal-use test dooms the five-
acre zoning restriction to constitutional perdition unless the towns-
people prove willing to purchase the land from its present owner. 
One cannot dispute that result under any concern with normal pat-
terns of use given its disproportionate impact. The issues in Nollan, 
however, appear a bit more complex. Again, my prediction seems 
to have failed: the Coastal Commission digs in its heels. What 
about the remedy? Make it justify the initial restrictions that the 
state wants to impose on new construction. In Nollan, houses were 
built up to the left and the right, so the restriction flunks both the 
normal-use and the disproportionate-impact tests. Going further, 
the construction of a single-family home has never been held a nui-
sance at common law, even by judges willing to stretch tort law. 
Thus, we can reduce the perils of the bargaining process by denying 
the state the platform on which to launch its case. If the compensa-
tion path remains available for both lateral easement and beach-
front homes, then why not prevent the state from bundling the 
easement into the permit process? 
How about rent control of mobile-home pads and the unremit-
ting hostility toward development in California? Little hope lies in 
asking the California courts to declare their own state law decisions 
unconstitutional on federal grounds, but Fischel contends that even 
judicial decisions that eradicate traditional rights could trigger just 
compensation obligations under the federal constitution.38 Surely, 
therefore, it is conceivable to him that the state may strike down a 
set of policies that he regards as mischievous or worse. 
Where then does the difference lie? Here Fischel's argument 
rests on his belief that a democratic process cannot tolerate auto-
cratic judges - but the payoff is not there. Even in ·a world of 
constitutional deference, someone has to interpret the statutes and 
regulations that make up an indisputable part of the legal corpus. 
When courts mangle these beyond recognition, the will of the legis-
lature is subverted, often with disastrous consequences. All theo-
ries of judicial interpretation require responsible action by judges, 
even in statutory settings. Questions of judicial competence persist, 
even in a world of judicial restraint. The concern that judges will 
behave badly pervades all constitutional regimes. Worse still for 
Fischel's thesis, he seems quite convinced that the California court 
exacerbated the problem in local housing markets by denying plau-
38. See pp. 331-32 (endorsing Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 
1449 (1990)). 
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sible developer claims. Thus, judicial restraint also has its real 
costs, and error is everywhere. In a world with judges, the best 
hope is to develop a legal culture that responds to the problems of 
democratic power and political process. The issue is not a choice 
between judicial restraint and judicial activism. Rather, it is the op-
timal use of judicial intelligence when faced with hard social 
problems and difficult constitutional texts. 
Fischel's approach does not escape this problem. Under his ba-
sic approach, the greater the exit rights, the less the direct supervi-
sion. Yet, he fails to explain how a system of judicial restraint can 
generate a constitutional right to exit in the first place, a point of no 
small importance given that state legislatures have, for example, 
taken to imposing stern prohibitions against insurance companies 
that no longer wish to do business within their states.39 Unless that 
right can be secured under the Constitution, then a single stroke of 
the pen can neutralize the distinction between mobile and immobile 
capital to the detriment of us all. 
Likewise, his system requires, without any .clear explanation, 
that judges take different stances to legislation passed by different 
levels of government. To be sure, local politics may tend to be 
more skewed than state and national politics. Yet that is not always 
the case. The administration of the DNR regulations in Michigan 
provides a strong counterexample: the local governments with 
comprehensive responsibilities perform better than state officials 
with limited responsibilities most of the time. Matters are further 
confounded by the fact that it is easier to use the exit right, assum-
ing that it is secured, against local governments than against state 
and national ones. It is also easy to find restrictive legislation at the 
state level that ties the hands of local authorities otherwise anxious 
to promote real estate development. The Michigan DNR possesses 
that characteristic, as does the South Carolina Coastal Council. In 
addition, the federal government can place stringent restrictions on 
land-use controls that may incite intensive local opposition. The 
Endangered Species Act40 and the federal regulation of wetlands41 
are two obvious examples. So which way does the balance cut? 
What then should be done with the differences between levels of 
governments? The invocation of multiple standards of review in-
creases the number of opportunities for judicial discretion - and 
judicial confusion. Furthermore, they appear unnecessary. Rather 
than try to fashion such different standards, it seems preferable to 
39. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:33B (1990), sustained in State Fann Mutual Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. New Jersey, 590 A.2d 191 (N.J. 1991). See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 202-05. 
40. 16 u.s.c. §§ 1531-44 (1988). 
41. See North American Wetlands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 4401-14 (Supp. 
1995). 
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stick with a uniform standard. If, as Fischel contends, local govern-
ments do misbehave more frequently and with more telling effect 
than do state or national governments, then the courts will more 
frequently invalidate their rules and ordinances. If they do not, 
then the courts will not. Either way, the question of whether an: 
ordinance lives or dies should tum on what it says. It should not 
depend on who enacts it, nor on theories about how different 
branches of governments behave. The questions of what the law 
provides, whether it has a uniform impact, and whether there is po-
lice power justification must be answered under a uniform standard 
of adjudication. 
· So it is back to Aristotle. Just why is all this so extreme? The 
uniform application of the takings clause to regulation offers a ra-
tional and measured response to the problem of governance better 
than those that Fischel proposes. A set of sensible tests leads to just 
the outcomes that he wants in all the cases that we have considered. 
Better sound than moderate. 
The final irony is this. A strict reading of the Takings Clause 
generates of itself a moderate position. On the one Aristotelian 
extreme lies an absolutist rule that never allows the state to take 
property, even for public use, without the individual consent of its 
owner. At the other extreme lies a rule that permits the state to 
take or regulate property without compensation so long as it be-
lieves (or says) that the taking is for the public good. The first posi-
tion runs the risk of massive holdouts; the second runs the risk of 
expropriation. The better path lies in between. Give the Takings 
Clause with its just compensation requirement its ordinary meaning 
and by that simple step alone we shall move far down the road to 
establishing the sound balance between government power and pri-
vate rights. It is just this message that Fischel's fine and informative 
book should have hammered home, but did not. 
